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We study the dynamics of a version of the batch minority
game, with random external information and with different
types of inhomogeneous decision noise (additive and multi-
plicative), using generating functional techniques a` la De Do-
minicis. The control parameters in this model are the ratio
α = p/N of the number p of possible values for the exter-
nal information over the number N of trading agents, and
the statistical properties of the agents’ decision noise param-
eters. The presence of decision noise is found to have the gen-
eral effect of damping macroscopic oscillations, which explains
why in certain parameter regions it can effectively reduce the
market volatility, as observed in earlier studies. In the limit
N → ∞ we (i) solve the first few time steps of the dynamics
(for any α), (ii) calculate the location αc of the phase tran-
sition (signaling the onset of anomalous response), and (iii)
solve the statics for α > αc. We find that αc is not sensitive
to additive decision noise, but we arrive at non-trivial phase
diagrams in the case of multiplicative noise. Our theoretical
results find excellent confirmation in numerical simulations.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le,87.23.Ge,05.70.Ln,64.60.Ht
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the more recent application domains of equi-
librium and non-equilibrium statistical mechanics is the
analysis of simplified models describing large markets of
competing traders (or agents). One such model, which
in spite of its apparent simplicity was found to exhibit
highly non-trivial behaviour and has therefore attracted
much attention, is the so-called Minority Game (MG)
[1,2], which is a variation on the so-called El-Farol bar
problem [3] which mimics in a highly idealized fashion
a market of speculators attempting to profit by buying
when most others wish to sell or selling when others wish
to buy, without individual knowledge of their fellows but
only of their collective consequences and external infor-
mation available to all. An extensive overview of the
literature on the MG and its many variations and exten-
sions can be found in [4]. The striking feature of the MG,
clearly observed in numerical simulations, is the nontriv-
ial dependence of the market volatility (measuring global
fluctuations) on the dimensionality of the information
supplied to the agents (which is defined as the relative
number α of different values which the information can
take). For large α the volatility approaches the value
corresponding to random trading, and the system is er-
godic. As α is reduced, also the volatility is found to
decrease beneath random, which is indicative of a more
efficient market, where agents have ‘learned’ to improve
the effectiveness of their selection of trading strategies. A
further decrease of α will at some critical point αc force
the system to undergo a phase transition to a highly non-
ergodic regime, where both a high-volatility state and a
low-volatility state can emerge, dependent on initial con-
ditions (this was only appreciated later).
In the original minority game, the information supplied
to the agents consisted of the actual history of the mar-
ket. However, it was soon realized [5] that the dynamics
of the MG remains largely unaltered if, instead of the true
history of the market, random information is supplied to
the agents; given α, the only relevant condition is that
all agents must be given the same information (whether
sensible or otherwise). This led to a considerable sim-
plification of theoretical approaches to the MG, since it
reduced the process to a Markovian one. A further gen-
eralization of the game was the introduction of agents’
decision noise [6], which was shown not only to improve
worse than random behaviour but also, more surprisingly,
to be able to make it better than random. The study [6]
was followed by a number of papers aiming to develop
a solvable statistical mechanical theory, either by using
decision noise to ‘regularize’ the stochastic equations and
replace these by deterministic ones (followed by an equi-
librium analysis of the ergodic regime, built on the con-
struction and exploitation of a Lyapunov function) [7,8],
or by concentrating further on analysis of the stochastic
equations themselves [9]. Since the MG process does not
obey detailed balance, such studies (which also involved
different implementations of the decision noise), proved
to be hard, and their results partly controversial [10,11]
(especially with regard to the questions of whether and
when the stochastic MG equations can be replaced by
suitable deterministic ones).
More recently, in [12] the analysis of the MG was ap-
proached from a different angle: all problems and debates
regarding microscopic determinism were simply avoided
by re-defining the MG dynamics directly in the form of
discrete-time deterministic equations, without decision
noise (the so-called ‘Batch Minority Game’). This al-
lowed for an exact solution of the model using generating
functional techniques a` la De Dominicis [13], which was
found to be in excellent agreement with numerical simu-
lations, and which (due to it being dynamical in nature)
even applied to the non-ergodic regime. The present
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study, which can be regarded as a natural follow-up on
[12], achieves the following objectives. We generalize
the ‘Thermal Minority Game’ such as to allow different
agents to have different levels of decision noise. This in-
troduces inhomogeneity into the agent population, which
leads to interesting new phenomena and phase diagrams.
We generalize and apply the (exact) formalism of [12]
(which was developed for the deterministic MG) to the
case of having inhomogeneous decision noise, within the
context of the discrete-time deterministic (‘batch’) equa-
tions. All our theoretical results are shown to find excel-
lent confirmation in extensive numerical simulations.
II. MODEL DEFINITIONS
The minority game involves N agents, labeled with
Roman indices i, j, k, etc. At each round ℓ of the game,
all agents act on the basis of the same piece of exter-
nal information I(ℓ). In the original model [1] the his-
tory of the actual market was used as the information
given to the agents. In view of the observation in [5]
that random information is equally efficacious we here
consider that at each round ℓ the agents are given the in-
formation I(ℓ) = Iµ(ℓ), where for each ℓ the label µ(ℓ)
is chosen randomly and independently from p = αN
possible values, i.e. µ(ℓ) ∈ {1, . . . , αN}. To determine
how to convert the external information into a trading
decision, each agent i has at his/her disposal S strate-
gies Ria = (R
1
ia, . . . , R
αN
ia ) ∈ {−1, 1}αN ; a ∈ {1, . . . , S}.
Each component Rµia is selected randomly and indepen-
dently from {−1, 1} before the start of the game, with
uniform probabilities, and remains fixed throughout the
game. The strategies introduce quenched disorder into
the model. Each strategy Ria of every agent i is given
an initial valuation or point-score pia(0). In the deter-
ministic version of the game, given a choice µ(ℓ) made
for the information presented at round ℓ, every agent i
selects the strategy which for trader i has the highest
valuation at that point in time, i.e. the strategy with
label a˜i(ℓ) = arg max pia(ℓ), and subsequently makes
a binary bid bi(ℓ) = R
µ(ℓ)
ia˜i(ℓ)
. The (re-scaled) total bid
at stage ℓ is defined as A(ℓ) = N−1/2
∑
i bi(ℓ). Each
agent subsequently updates the pay-off values of each of
his/her strategies a on the basis of comparing the bid
which would have resulted from playing that strategy
with the actual outcome:
pia(ℓ+1) = pia(ℓ)−Rµ(ℓ)ia A(ℓ). (1)
The minus sign in this expression ensures that strate-
gies that would have produced a minority decision are
rewarded. Since the qualitative behaviour of the market
fluctuations was found to be very much the same for all
non-extensive numbers of strategies per agent larger than
one [5], we restrict our discussion to the S = 2 model,
where the equations can be simplified upon introducing
for each agent the instantaneous difference between the
two strategy valuations, qi(ℓ) = [pi1(ℓ) − pi2(ℓ)]/2, as
well as the average strategy ωi = (Ri1 + Ri2)/2 and
the difference between the strategies ξi = (Ri1−Ri2)/2.
The actually selected strategy in round ℓ can now be
written explicitly as a function of a binary variable
si(ℓ) = ±1, which in the original model takes the value
si(ℓ) = sgn[qi(ℓ)], viz. Ria˜i(ℓ) = ωi + si(ℓ)ξi, and the
evolution of the difference will now be given by:
qi(ℓ+1) = qi(ℓ)− ξµ(ℓ)i [Ωµ(ℓ)+
1√
N
∑
j
ξ
µ(ℓ)
j sj(ℓ)], (2)
with Ω = N−1/2
∑
j ωj ∈ IRαN .
In the so-called thermal minority game [6], the deter-
ministic decision rule sj(ℓ) = sgn[qj(ℓ)] was replaced by
a stochastic recipe; another recipe was employed in [9].
Here we generalise this idea further, by allowing different
traders to have different levels of stochasticity in their
decision making. We will consider decision noise of the
general form
sj(ℓ) = σ[qj(ℓ), zj(ℓ)|Tj], (3)
in which the zj(ℓ) are independent and zero-average ran-
dom numbers, described by some symmetric distribu-
tion P (z) which is normalised according to
∫
dz P (z) =∫
dz P (z)z2 = 1. The function σ[q, z|T ] ∈ {−1, 1} is
chosen to interpolate smoothly via a single control pa-
rameter T between σ[q, z|0] = sgn[q] for T = 0 and
σ[q, z|∞] = ±1 (randomly, with equal probabilities) for
T = ∞, so that T provides a measure of the degree of
stochasticity in the traders’ decision making (with ran-
dom choice in the case q = 0). Typical examples are
additive and multiplicative noise definitions such as
additive : σ[q, z|T ] = sgn[q + Tz] (4)
multiplicative : σ[q, z|T ] = sgn[q] sgn[1 + Tz]. (5)
In the first case (4) the noise has the potential to be
overruled by the so-called ‘frozen’ agents [2], who have
qi(t) ∼ q˜it for t→∞ [10–12]. In the second case the de-
cision noise will even retain its effect for ‘frozen’ agents
(if they exist). The above definitions represent situations
where for Ti > 0 a trader i need not always use his/her
‘best’ strategy; for Ti → 0 we revert back to the deter-
ministic model. The impact of the multiplicative noise
(5) can be characterised by the monotonic function
λ(T ) =
∫
dz P (z) sgn[1 + Tz], (6)
with λ(0) = 1 and λ(∞) = 0. For example, for a Gaus-
sian P (z) one has λ(T ) = erf[1/
√
2T ].
Finally in the formulation of the model, we replace
the above ‘on-line’ version of the microscopic dynamics
(2), following [12], by a so-called ‘batch’ version, where,
rather than modifying the {qi} after every observation
of an individual piece of external information, they are
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modified according to the average effect of the possible
choices for the external information:
qi(ℓ+1) = qi(ℓ)− 1
p
p∑
µ=1
ξµi [Ω
µ+
1√
N
∑
j
ξµj sj(ℓ)], (7)
giving
qi(t+ 1) = qi(t)− hi −
∑
j
Jij σ[qj(t), zj(t)|Tj ], (8)
where Jij = 2N
−1ξi · ξj and hi = 2N− 12 ξi ·Ω. The spe-
cific choice of time scaling in (8) has been made for later
convenience. The batch dynamics (8) has the advantage
of being sufficiently simple and transparent to allow for
a straightforward exact dynamical solution of the model,
using generating functional techniques [12]. The process
(8) is not exactly equivalent to (2), not even for N →∞
(see [14] for the generating functional analysis of the on-
line dynamics and its relation to the batch alternative),
but it does present qualitatively similar features.
There are many ways to introduce a stochastic element
into the traders’ decision making. For instance, the two
versions of the minority game studied in [6,9] correspond
to the forms (4) and (5) with P (z) = 12K[1− tanh2(Kz)]
and Ti = T for all i (giving strategy selection probabil-
ities of the form Prob(σ = ±1) ∼ e±βq and Prob(σ =
±1) ∼ e±βsgn[q], respectively).
The magnitude of the market fluctuations, or volatility,
is given by
σ2 = 〈1
p
∑
µ
(Aµ)2〉z − 〈1
p
∑
µ
Aµ〉2z , (9)
where Aµ = N−
1
2
∑
i[ω
µ
i +siξ
µ
i ] and where 〈. . .〉z denotes
an average over the random numbers {zi}. One easily
derives
〈1
p
∑
µ
Aµ〉z = 1
αN
√
N
∑
i
〈si〉z
∑
µ
ξµi +O(N−
1
2 ), (10)
〈1
p
∑
µ
(Aµ)2〉z = 1
2
+
1
αN
[
∑
i
hi〈si〉z + 1
2
∑
ij
Jij〈sisj〉z]
+O(N− 12 ). (11)
Purely random trading corresponds to 〈 1p
∑
µA〉z = 0
and σ2 = 1. Following [12] we also define the volatility
matrix Ξtt′ :
Ξtt′ = 〈1
p
∑
µ
[Aµt − 〈
1
p
∑
ν
Aνt 〉z][Aµt′ − 〈
1
p
∑
ν
Aνt′〉z ]〉z ,
(12)
which measures the temporal correlations of the market
fluctuations. Note that σ2t = Ξtt. In the case where the
average bid 〈A〉 is zero (as in the present model), the
volatility measures the efficiency of the market.
III. GENERATING FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS
The canonical tool to deal with the dynamics of the
present problem is generating functional analysis a` la De
Dominicis [13], which allows one to carry out the disorder
average (here: the average over all strategies) and take
the N → ∞ limit exactly. The final result of the analy-
sis is a set of closed equations, which can be interpreted
as describing the dynamics of an effective ‘single agent’
[13,15]. Due to the disorder in the process, this single
agent will acquire an effective ‘memory’, i.e. he/she will
evolve according to a non-trivial non-Markovian stochas-
tic process. Here we will follow closely the steps taken in
[12], and we refer to the latter paper for full details of the
calculation. In contrast to the situation in [12]), for the
present noisy version of the game one finds a microscopic
transition probability density operator W (q|q′):
W (q|q′) =
∫
dqˆ
(2π)N
〈e
∑
i
iq̂i(qi−q′i+hi+
∑
j
Jijs
′
j)〉z, (13)
with the short-hand s′j = σ[q
′
j , zj |Tj ]. The moment gen-
erating functional for a stochastic process of the present
type is defined as
Z[ψ] = 〈 ei
∑
t
∑
i
ψi(t)qi(t) 〉
=
∫ ∏
t
[dq(t) W (q(t+ 1)|q(t))] p0(q(0))
× ei
∑
t
∑
i
ψi(t)qi(t). (14)
Derivation of the generating functional with respect to
the conjugate variables ψ generates all moments of q at
arbitrary times. Upon introducing the two short-hands:
wµt =
√
2√
N
∑
i
q̂i(t)ξ
µ
i , x
µ
t =
√
2√
N
∑
i
si(t)ξ
µ
i , (15)
as well as Dq =
∏
it[dqi(t)/
√
2π], Dw =
∏
µt[dw
µ
t /
√
2π]
and Dx =
∏
µt[dx
µ
t /
√
2π] (with similar definitions for
Dqˆ, Dwˆ andDxˆ, respectively), the generating functional
takes the following form:
Z[ψ] =
∫
DwDwˆDxDxˆ ei
∑
tµ
[ŵµt w
µ
t +x̂
µ
t x
µ
t +
√
2wµt (Ω
µ+xµt )]
×
∫
DqDqˆ p0(q(0)) 〈e
−i
√
2√
N
∑
µi
ξµ
i
∑
t
[ŵµt q̂i(t)+x̂
µ
t si(t)]〉z
× ei
∑
ti[q̂i(t)(qi(t+1)−qi(t)−θi(t))+ψi(t)qi(t)], (16)
where, as in [12], we introduced external ‘forces’ θi(t) to
generate response functions.
To describe typical behaviour, and in view of the self-
averaging character of the large N limit, at this stage
we average over over the explicit choices of the quenched
random parameters {R}. These averages are not affected
in any way by the introduction of the noise variables
{zi} or the independent temperatures Ti, and the fur-
ther procedure of [12] still applies here, generating the
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dynamical order parameters Ctt′ = N
−1∑
i si(t)si(t
′),
Ktt′ = N
−1∑
i si(t)q̂i(t
′), and Ltt′ = N−1
∑
i q̂i(t)q̂i(t
′)
and their conjugates. For times which do not scale
with N and for simple initial conditions of the form
p0(q) =
∏
i p0(qi) one thus finds:
Z[ψ] =
∫
[DCDCˆ][DKDKˆ][DLDLˆ] eN [Ψ+Φ+Ω]+O(N
0).
(17)
The O(N0) term in the exponent is independent of the
fields {ψi(t)} and {θi(t)}. The three relevant exponents
in (17) are given by the following expressions:
Ψ = i
∑
tt′
[Ĉtt′Ctt′ + K̂tt′Ktt′ + L̂tt′Ltt′ ], (18)
Φ = α ln
[∫
DwDwˆDxDxˆ ei
∑
t
[ŵtwt+x̂txt+wtxt]
× e− 12
∑
tt′ [wtwt′+ŵtLtt′ ŵt′+2x̂tKtt′ ŵt′+x̂tCtt′ x̂t′ ]
]
(19)
Ω =
1
N
∑
i
ln
[∫
DqDqˆ p0(q(0))
× ei
∑
t
[q̂(t)[q(t+1)−q(t)−θi(t)]+ψi(t)q(t)]−i
∑
tt′ q̂(t)Lˆtt′ q̂(t
′)
× 〈e−i
∑
tt′ [si(t)Cˆtt′si(t
′)+si(t)Kˆtt′ q̂(t
′)]〉z
]
. (20)
Here si(t) = σ[q(t), zt|Ti] and the average 〈. . .〉z has
now been reduced to a single site (but many-time)
one: 〈g[z1, z2, . . .]〉z =
∫∏
t[dztP (zt)] g[z1, z2, . . .]. Fol-
lowing [12] we have also introduced the short-hands
Dq =
∏
t[dq(t)/
√
2π], Dw =
∏
t[dwt/
√
2π], Dx =∏
t[dxt/
√
2π] (with similar definitions for Dqˆ, Dwˆ and
Dxˆ). Note that all the quantities appearing in (17) are
macroscopic; all the microscopic variables have been in-
tegrated out.
IV. THE SADDLE-POINT EQUATIONS
We can now evaluate (17) by saddle-point integration,
in the limit N → ∞. We define Gtt′ = −iKtt′. Taking
derivatives with respect to the generating fields and using
the normalisation Z[0] = 1 then gives (at the physical
saddle-point) the usual identifications
Ctt′ = lim
N→∞
1
N
∑
i
〈si(t)si(t′)〉, (21)
Gtt′ = lim
N→∞
1
N
∑
i
∂
∂θi(t′)
〈si(t)〉, (22)
and also
Ltt′ = − lim
N→∞
1
N
∑
i
∂2
∂θi(t)∂θi(t′)
1 = 0. (23)
Putting ψi(t) = 0 (they are no longer needed) and θi(t) =
θ(t) then simplifies (20) to
Ω =
∫ ∞
0
dT W (T ) ln
[∫
DqDqˆ p0(q(0))
× ei
∑
t
q̂(t)[q(t+1)−q(t)−θ(t)]−i∑
tt′ q̂(t)Lˆtt′ q̂(t
′)
× 〈e−i
∑
tt′ [s(t)Cˆtt′s(t
′)+s(t)Kˆtt′ q̂(t
′)]〉z
]
, (24)
in which now s(t) = σ[q(t), zt|T ], and where W (T ) de-
notes the distribution of local noise strengths:
W (T ) = lim
N→∞
1
N
∑
i
δ[T − Ti]. (25)
Extremisation of the extensive exponent N [Ψ+Φ+Ω] of
(17) with respect to {C, Cˆ,K, Kˆ, L, Lˆ} gives the saddle-
point equations
Ctt′ = 〈s(t)s(t′)〉⋆ Gtt′ = ∂〈s(t)〉⋆
∂θ(t′)
, (26)
Ĉtt′ =
i∂Φ
∂Ctt′
K̂tt′ =
i∂Φ
∂Ktt′
L̂tt′ =
i∂Φ
∂Ltt′
. (27)
The effective single-trader averages 〈. . .〉⋆, generated by
taking derivatives of (20), are defined as
〈f [{q, s}]〉⋆ =
∫ ∞
0
dT W (T )
{∫
Dq 〈M [{q, s}]f [{q, s}]〉z∫
Dq 〈M [{q, s}]〉z
}
,
(28)
M [{q, s}] = p0(q(0)) e−i
∑
tt′ s(t)Cˆtt′ s(t
′)
×
∫
Dqˆ e−i
∑
tt′ q̂(t)Lˆtt′ q̂(t
′)
× ei
∑
t
q̂(t)[q(t+1)−q(t)−θ(t)−∑
t′ Kˆ
T
tt′s(t
′)], (29)
Upon elimination of the trio {Cˆ, Kˆ, Lˆ} via (27) we ob-
tain exact closed equations for the disorder-averaged
correlation- and response functions in the N →∞ limit:
equations (26), with the effective single trader measure
(29). One recovers the theory of [12] upon putting
W (T ) = δ(T ).
Since the introduction of decision noise into the dy-
namics has only affected the term Ω (24), compared to
the analysis in [12], the simplifications of the term Φ (re-
flecting the statistical properties of the trading strategies)
derived in [12] apply unaltered, so that at the physical
saddle-point we again find
L̂ = −1
2
iα(1 +G)−1D(1 +GT )−1, (30)
K̂T = −α(1 +G)−1, (31)
Ĉ = 0, (32)
where AT denotes the transpose of the matrix A, and the
entries of the matrix D are given by Dtt′ = 1+Ctt′ . We
now find our effective single trader measure M [{q, s}] of
(29) reducing further to
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M [{q, s}] = p0(q(0))
×
∫
Dqˆ e−
1
2α
∑
tt′ q̂(t)[(1+G)
−1D(1+GT )−1]tt′ q̂(t
′)
× ei
∑
t
q̂(t)[q(t+1)−q(t)−θ(t)+α∑
t′ (1+G)
−1
tt′ s(t
′)]. (33)
For a given value of T , this describes a stochastic single-
agent process of the form
q(t+1) = q(t)− α
∑
t′≤t
(1 +G)−1tt′ σ[q(t
′), zt′ |T ]
+ θ(t) +
√
α η(t). (34)
Causality ensures that (1 + G)−1tt′ = 0 for t
′ > t. The
variable zt represents the original single-trader decision
noise, with 〈zt〉 = 0 and 〈ztzt′〉 = δtt′ , and η(t) is a
disorder-generated Gaussian noise with zero mean and
with temporal correlations given by 〈η(t)η(t′)〉 = Σtt′ :
Σ = (1 +G)−1D(1 +GT )−1. (35)
The correlation- and response functions (21,22) are the
dynamic order parameters of the problem, and must be
solved self-consistently from the closed equations
Ctt′ = 〈 σ[q(t), zt|T ] σ[q(t′), zt′ |T ] 〉⋆, (36)
Gtt′ =
∂
∂θ(t′)
〈 σ[q(t), zt|T ] 〉⋆, (37)
which, following (28), now also involve averaging over the
distribution of the noise strengths T . Note thatM [{q, s}]
as given by (33) is normalised, i.e.
∫
Dq M [{q, s}] = 1,
so the associated averages reduce to
〈f [{q, s}]〉⋆ =
∫ ∞
0
dT W (T )
∫
Dq 〈M [{q, s}]f [{q, s}]〉z.
(38)
The calculation in [12] of the disorder-averaged average
bid and the volatility matrix (including the single-time
volatility σ2t = Ξtt) still hold, and hence
lim
N→∞
〈A〉t = 0, lim
N→∞
Ξtt′ =
1
2
Σtt′ . (39)
V. THE FIRST TIME STEPS
For the first few time steps one can calculate quite
easily the order parameters (correlation- and response
functions) and the volatility, from (33), using the simpli-
fications which follow from causality such as
[Gn]tt′ = 0 for t
′ > t− n. (40)
At t = 0 this immediately allows us to conclude that
Σ00 = D00 = 2. We now obtain from (33) the joint
statistics at times t = 1, given a value for T :
p(q(1)|q(0)) =∫
dz0 P (z0)
e−[q(1)−q(0)−θ(0)+α σ[q(0),z0|T ]]
2/4α
2
√
απ
. (41)
Equation (41) allows us to calculate C10 and G10, al-
though the presence of the decision noise induces expres-
sions which are significantly more difficult to work out
explicitly than those of the noise-free case in [12], and
which will depend on the choice made for σ[q, z|T ]:
C10 =
∫ ∞
0
dT W (T )
∫
dz0dz1P (z0)P (z1)
∫
dq(0)p0(q(0))
×
∫
dq(1)
2
√
απ
e−[q(1)−q(0)−θ(0)+α σ[q(0),z0|T ]]
2/4α
× σ[q(0), z0|T ] σ[q(1), z1|T ], (42)
G10 =
∫ ∞
0
dT W (T )
∫
dz0dz1P (z0)P (z1)
∫
dq(0)p0(q(0))
×
∫
dq(1)
2
√
απ
e−[q(1)−q(0)−θ(0)+α σ[q(0),z0|T ]]
2/4α
× ∂
∂q(1)
σ[q(1), z1|T ]. (43)
We can now move to the next time step, again using (40),
where we need the noise covariances Σ11 and Σ10:
Σ10 = 1 + C10 − 2G10, (44)
Σ11 = 2− 2G10[1 + C01] + 2[G10]2. (45)
This procedure can in principle be repeated for an arbi-
trary number of time steps.
We now specialise to the case where the game is ini-
tialised in a tabula rasa manner, i.e. p(q(0)) = δ[q0], and
where we have no perturbation fields, i.e. θ(t) = 0. Now,
upon also using the symmetry of P (z), we can reduce the
above results to
C10 =
∫ ∞
0
dT W (T )
∫
dz P (z)
∫
dq
4
√
απ
e−[q+α]
2/4α
× {σ[q, z|T ]− σ[−q,−z|T ]} . (46)
G10 =
∫ ∞
0
dT W (T )
∫
dz P (z)
∫
dq
4
√
απ
e−[q+α]
2/4α
× ∂
∂q
{σ[q, z|T ]− σ[−q,−z|T ]} . (47)
Inspection of these expressions for large and small α, and
for the specific choices (4,5) reveals the following. For
α→∞ one finds
lim
α→∞
G10 = 0, lim
α→∞
Σ11 = 2, (48)
for both noise types. The order parameters C10 and Σ,
in contrast, are sensitive to the type of noise chosen. For
additive noise of the form (4) one has
lim
α→∞
C10 = −1, lim
α→∞
Σ10 = 0, (49)
5
whereas for multiplicative noise (5) one has
lim
α→∞C10 = −
∫ ∞
0
dT W (T )λ(T ), (50)
lim
α→∞
Σ10 = 1−
∫ ∞
0
dT W (T )λ(T ). (51)
In both cases the negativity of C10 shows that the tabula-
rasa initialised system immediately enters an oscillation,
with the qi(1) on average having opposite sign to the
corresponding qi(0). Initially, additive noise is found not
to play a role, and the effective disorder-generated noise
components η(t) decorrelate, compared with the deter-
ministic case of [12]. Multiplicative noise, on the other
hand, is seen to retain an impact, even for short times
and large α, and to cause a reduction of the oscillation
amplitude.
Now we turn to small α, where we make the choice
P (z) = (2π)−
1
2 e−z
2/2 in order to work out integrals ex-
plicitly. For additive noise (4) we find
C10 = −α
√
2√
π
∫ ∞
0
dT W (T ) T−1 +O(α 32 ), (52)
G10 =
√
2√
π
∫ ∞
0
dT W (T ) T−1 +O(α 12 ) (53)
(provided the above integrals over T exist; if they do not,
we revert back to the leading orders of the T = 0 case [12],
i.e. C10 = O(
√
α) and G10 = O(1/
√
α)). Combination
with the expressions (44,45) shows that in leading order
η(1) = (
1
2
−G10)η(0) + w + . . . (54)
in which w is a zero-average Gaussian variable, indepen-
dent of η(0), with variance 〈w2〉 = 3/2. Hence we find
from the effective single spin equation (34):
q(1) =
√
α η(0) +O(α) (55)
q(2) =
√
α
[
(
3
2
−G10)η(0) + w
]
+O(α). (56)
We observe, as in [12], that for small α and additive
decision noise the first two time steps are driven pre-
dominantly by the disorder-generated noise component in
(34). However, whether this noise component starts oscil-
lating in sign is, in the case of decision noise, crucially de-
pendent on the distribution of temperatures; only when∫
dT W (T ) T−1 is sufficiently large should we expect the
system to enter the high volatility state. For multiplica-
tive noise, on the other hand, we arrive for small α at the
leading orders
C10 = −
√
α√
π
∫ ∞
0
dT W (T )λ(T ) +O(α 32 ), (57)
G10 =
1√
απ
∫ ∞
0
dT W (T )λ(T ) +O(√α) + . . . (58)
Here the oscillation is much stronger (provided we do
not scale the temperatures with α). Combination with
the expressions (44,45) shows that in leading order the
disorder-generated noise not only drives the oscillation,
but is also being amplified by a factor of order α−1/2:
η(1) = −G10η(0) +O(α0) (59)
The effective single trader equation subsequently gives:
q(1) =
√
α η(0) +O(α), (60)
q(2) = −η(0)√
π
∫ ∞
0
dT W (T )λ(T ) +O(√α). (61)
Thus, for small α and tabula rasa initialisation1 additive
decision noise has the most drastic effect on the dynam-
ics, changing the leading order of the relevant observables
by a factor
√
α (in contrast to multiplicative noise).
VI. STATIONARY STATE FOR α > αC(W (T ))
If the game has reached a time-translation invariant
stationary state without long-term memory, then Gtt′ =
G(t − t′), Ctt′ = C(t − t′) and Σtt′ = Σ(t − t′). In this
section we assume that the stationary state is one without
anomalous response, i.e. limτ→∞
∑
t≤τ G(t) = k exists.
The lower limit of such behaviour in α defines αc(W (T )).
In a stationary state one generally finds agents who
change strategy frequently, but also agents who are con-
sistently in the minority group. For the latter ‘frozen’
agents, the values of qi will grow linearly in time.
We follow [12] and separate the two groups by in-
troducing q˜i(t) = qi(t)/t; frozen agents will be those
for whom limt→∞ q˜i(t) 6= 0, and the quantity φ =
limǫ→0 limt→∞〈θ[|q˜(t)|−ǫ]〉⋆ gives the fraction of ‘frozen’
agents in the original N -agent system, for N → ∞.
Transformation of the process (34) gives, for a given T :
q˜T (t) =
1
t
q˜T (1) +
√
α
t
∑
t′<t
η(t′)
−α
t
∑
t′<t
∑
t′′≤t′
(1 +G)−1t′t′′ σ[q˜T (t
′′), zt′′ |T ]. (62)
We now define q˜T = limt→∞ q˜T (t) (assuming this limit
exists) and take the limit t→∞ in (62), giving
q˜T = − α
1 + k
mT +
√
α η, (63)
with the time averages mT = limτ→∞ 1τ
∑
t≤τ σ[qt, zt|T ]
and η = limτ→∞ 1τ
∑
t≤τ η(t). The variance of η follows
from (35):
1Note that the small α expansions in this section are made
for fixedW (T ); the observed behaviour is likely to be different
when W (T ) is allowed to scale with α.
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〈η2〉 = (1 + k)−2[1 + lim
τ,τ ′→∞
1
ττ ′
∑
t≤τ
∑
t′≤τ ′
Ctt′ ]
= [1 + 〈m2T 〉⋆]/(1 + k)2. (64)
Note that 〈m2T 〉⋆ = limτ→∞ τ−1
∑
t≤τ C(t) = c.
The integrated response (or static susceptibility) k =
limτ→∞
∑
t≤τ G(t) is also calculated along the lines
of [12]. One writes the response function as Gtt′ =
α−
1
2 〈∂ σ[q(t), zt|T ]/∂η(t′)〉⋆. Integration by parts in this
expression generates
〈∂ σ[q(t), zt|T ]/∂η(t′)〉⋆ =
∑
t′′
Σ−1t′t′′〈σ[q(t), zt|T ]η(t′′)〉⋆,
(65)
and hence
√
α
∑
t′′
〈η(t′)η(t′′)〉GTt′′t = 〈σ[q(t), zt|T ] η(t′)〉⋆. (66)
Averaging over the two times t and t′ now gives in a
stationary state without anomalous response:
〈mT η〉⋆ = k
√
α〈η2〉. (67)
Inserting the variance 〈η2〉, as given in (64), then gives
the general relation
〈ηmT 〉⋆ = k
√
α(1 + c)
(1 + k)2
. (68)
A. Additive Decision Noise
In the case of additive decision noise (4) we have
σ[q, z|T ] = sgn[q + zT ]. The effective agent is frozen if
q˜ 6= 0, in which case mT = sgn[q˜T ]. This solves equation
(63) if and only if |η| > √α/(1+ k). If |η| < √α/(1+ k),
on the other hand, the agent is not frozen; now q˜T = 0
and mT = (1 + k)η/
√
α. As a result, we can calculate
c = 〈m2T 〉⋆ and the fraction φ = 〈θ[|η| −
√
α/(1 + k)]〉 =
1− erf[
√
α/2(1 + c)] of frozen agents exactly as in in the
case [12] without decision noise, giving the deterministic
(i.e. W (T ) = δ(T )) result
c = 1− (1− 1 + c
α
) erf
[√
α
2(1 + c)
]
− 2
√
1 + c
2πα
e−
α
2(1+c) .
(69)
We use (68) and calculate the covariance 〈ηmT 〉⋆ exactly
as in [12]. The final result is
1
k
=
α
erf[
√
α
2(1+c) ]
− 1, (70)
with the value of c to be determined by solving Eqn. (69).
We find exactly the same transition point αc ≈ 0.33740,
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FIG. 1. The persistent correlation c as a function of
α = p/N , for multiplicative noise with W (T ) = δ[T − T ] and
different choices of the noise strength (T = 0, 1, 2 from top
to bottom). Connected markers: individual simulation runs,
with pN = αN2 = 106 and homogeneous initial conditions
where qi(0) = q(0) (circles: q(0) = 0, squares: q(0) = 10)
and in excess of 1000 iteration steps. Thick solid curves for
α > αc(W (T )): analytical predictions for homogeneous mul-
tiplicative decision noise. For α < αc(W (T )), where they
should no longer be correct, they have been continued as thick
dashed lines. For additive decision noise our theory predicts
independence of T for α > αc(W (T )), i.e. c as given by the
T = 0 curve of multiplicative noise.
signaling the divergence of the integrated response k, as
was found in the noise-free case.
Numerical simulations of the (batch) dynamics of
the present model (which we will not present here, for
brevity) confirm quite convincingly that, upon measur-
ing objects such as c or φ, in the case of additive deci-
sion noise one indeed exactly recovers the graphs of [12],
without any dependence on the noise parameters. This,
however, will turn out to be quite different in the case of
multiplicative noise.
B. Homogeneous Multiplicative Decision Noise
Next we turn to the case of multiplicative noise (5),
at first with the simplest distribution W (T ) = δ[T − T ],
where σ[q, z|T ] = sgn[q] sgn[1 + Tz], and where mT =
limτ→∞ τ−1
∑
t≤τ sgn[qT (t)] sgn[1 + Tzt]. Since there is
now only one noise strength in the system, T , we may
drop the subscripts T for variables such as q(t) or m,
without danger of confusion. For a frozen agent one now
finds
m = λ(T ) sgn[q˜]. (71)
This solves equation (63) when |η| > √αλ(T )/(1+ k). If
|η| < √αλ(T )/(1 + k), on the other hand, the agent is
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FIG. 2. The asymptotic fraction of frozen agents φ as
a function of α = p/N , for multiplicative noise with
W (T ) = δ[T − T ] and different choices of the noise strength
(T = 0, 1, 2 from top to bottom). Markers: individual sim-
ulation runs, with pN = αN2 = 106 and homogeneous initial
conditions where qi(0) = q(0) (circles: q(0) = 0, squares:
q(0) = 10) and in excess of 1000 iteration steps. Thick solid
curves for α > αc(W (T )): analytical predictions for homoge-
neous multiplicative decision noise. For α < αc(W (T )), where
they should no longer be correct, they have been continued
as thick dashed lines. For additive decision noise our theory
predicts independence of T , i.e. φ as given by the T = 0 curve
of multiplicative noise.
not frozen; now q˜T = 0 and m = (1 + k)η/
√
α. We can
again calculate c = 〈m2〉⋆ self-consistently, upon distin-
guishing between the two possibilities:
c = λ2(T )〈θ
[
|η| −
√
αλ(T )
1 + k
]
〉 (72)
+
(1 + k)2
α
〈θ
[√
αλ(T )
1 + k
− |η|
]
η2〉. (73)
Working out the Gaussian integrals describing the statics
of η, with variance (64), subsequently gives
c = λ2(T )−
[
λ2(T )− 1 + c
α
]
erf
√ αλ2(T )
2(1 + c)

−2λ(T )
√
1 + c
2πα
e−
αλ2(T )
2(1+c) . (74)
From this equation the value of c is solved numerically.
The fraction φ of frozen agents is given by
φ = 〈θ
[
|η| −
√
αλ(T )
1 + k
]
〉 = 1− erf
√ αλ2(T )
2(1 + c)
 . (75)
We calculate the remaining object 〈ηm〉⋆ in (68) by again
distinguishing between frozen and non-frozen agents and
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FIG. 3. Phase diagram in the (α, 1−λ(T )) plane for homo-
geneous multiplicative noise, i.e. W (T ) = δ[T −T ]. The solid
line separates a non-ergodic phase with anomalous response
(left) from an ergodic one without anomalous response (right).
For additive noise our theory predicts the T -independent tran-
sition given by the dashed line.
by using the two identities m = λ(T )sgn[η] (for frozen
agents) and m = η(1 + k)/
√
α (for fickle ones), both of
which follow from (63), giving
〈ηm〉⋆ = λ(T )〈θ
[
|η| −
√
αλ(T )
1 + k
]
|η|〉
+
1 + k√
α
〈θ
[√
αλ(T )
1 + k
− |η|
]
η2〉
=
1 + c
(1 + k)
√
α
erf
√ αλ2(T )
2(1 + c)
 .
Insertion into (68), together with (64), then gives the
desired expression for the integrated response:
1
k
=
α
erf[
√
αλ2(T )
2(1+c) ]
− 1, (76)
with the value of c to be determined by solving Eqn. (74).
Equivalently, using (75) we find, as in the T = 0 case [12]
k =
1− φ
α− 1 + φ. (77)
The integrated response k is positive and finite, and
our solution exact, for α > αc(W (T )). At αc(W (T ))
one finds that k diverges; this transition is, as for T =
0, found to happen when the fraction of fickle agents
equals α [7]. Finally, according to (74,76) we can write
αc(W (T )) as αc(W (T )) = erf[x], where x is the solution
of the transcendental equation
λ2(T )
{
erf[x]− 1 + 1
x
√
π
e−x
2
}
= 1. (78)
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Equivalently, we can write our transition line explicitly
in terms of the inverse error function as
λ(T c) =
{
αc +
e−[erf
inv[αc]]
2
erfinv[αc]
√
π
− 1
}− 12
, (79)
where λ(T ) ∈ [0, 1], see (6).
In figures 1 and 2 we show the solution of equation
(74) and the corresponding fraction φ of frozen agents as
functions of α, together with the values for c and φ as ob-
tained by carrying out numerical simulations of the batch
minority game (8) with homogeneous multiplicative de-
cision noise. The two figures for c and φ both show ex-
cellent agreement between theory and experiment above
αc(W (T )). One observes that, in addition to a reduction
in the persistent correlation, another effect of the intro-
duction of multiplicative decision noise is an overall in-
crease in the fraction of frozen agents. This is consistent
with our solution of the first few iteration steps, where
introducing decision noise had the effect of dampening
the oscillations. In figure 3 we show the system’s phase
diagrams for W (T ) = δ[T −T ], defined by the transition
line, where k = ∞. This line is given by the solution
of equation (79) in the case of multiplicative noise, and
by αc(W (T )) ≈ 0.33740 (i.e. the value corresponding to
λ(0) = 1) for additive noise. Below αc(W (T )) our simula-
tions show, as has been observed and reported earlier for
the deterministic case, that in the anomalous response re-
gion the stationary state reached by the system depends
critically on the initial conditions. For small values of the
|qi(0)| (i.e. weak initial strategy preferences) the system
enters a high-volatility state with low c and φ, whereas
for large values of the |qi(0)| (i.e. strong initial strategy
preferences) the system enters a low-volatility state with
large c and φ.
C. Inhomogeneous Multiplicative Decision Noise
Finally we turn to the more complicated situation of
multiplicative noise (5) with arbitrary distributions. For
a frozen agent and for a given value of T one has
mT = λ(T ) sgn[q˜]. (80)
As before, this solves equation (63) if |η| > √αλ(T )/(1+
k), whereas for |η| < √αλ(T )/(1 + k) the agent is fickle,
i.e. q˜T = 0 and mT = (1 + k)η/
√
α. According to
(36,37), the calculation of persistent order parameters
will now also involve averaging over the noise distribu-
tion. Since the macroscopic dynamics turns out to de-
pend on T only via λ(T ), it will be advantageous to define
w(λ) =
∫∞
0 dT W (T )δ[λ− λ(T )], or
w(λ) =
∫ ∞
0
dT W (T ) δ
[
λ−
∫
dz P (z) sgn[1+Tz]
]
.
(81)
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FIG. 4. The persistent correlation c as a func-
tion of α = p/N , for multiplicative noise with
W (T ′) = ǫδ[T ′ − T ] + (1 − ǫ)δ[T ′], for T = 1 and differ-
ent choices of the width (ǫ = 0, 0.5, 1 from top to bottom).
Markers: individual simulation runs, with pN = αN2 = 106
and homogeneous initial conditions where qi(0) = q(0) (cir-
cles: q(0) = 0, squares: q(0) = 10) and in excess of 1000
iteration steps. Solid curves for α > αc(W (T )): analytical
predictions. For α < αc(W (T )), where they should no longer
be correct, they have been continued as dashed lines.
Here λ ∈ [0, 1], with λ = 0 reflecting T → ∞ contribu-
tions and λ = 1 reflecting T → 0 ones. Now we may
write
c =
∫ 1
0
dλ w(λ)
{
λ2〈θ
[
|η| −
√
αλ
1 + k
]
〉
+
(1 + k)2
α
〈θ
[√
αλ
1 + k
− |η|
]
η2〉
}
=
∫ 1
0
dλ w(λ)
{
λ2 − 2λ
√
1 + c
2πα
e−
αλ2
2(1+c)
−
[
λ2 − 1 + c
α
]
erf
[√
αλ2
2(1 + c)
]}
. (82)
From this equation the value of c is solved numerically.
The fraction φ of frozen agents is given by
φ = 1−
∫ 1
0
dλ w(λ) erf
[√
αλ2
2(1 + c)
]
. (83)
We calculate the remaining object 〈ηmT 〉⋆ in (68)
by again distinguishing between frozen and non-frozen
agents and by using the two identities mT = λ(T )sgn[η]
(for frozen agents) and mT = η(1 + k)/
√
α (for the non-
frozen ones), both of which follow from (63), giving
〈ηmT 〉⋆ = 1 + c
(1 + k)
√
α
∫ 1
0
dλ w(λ) erf
[√
αλ2
2(1 + c)
]
.
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Insertion into (68), together with (64), then gives the
desired expression for the integrated response:
1
k
=
α∫ 1
0
dλ w(λ)erf
[√
αλ2
2(1+c)
] − 1, (84)
with the value of c to be determined by solving Eqn. (82).
Using (83) this can again be written in the familiar form
(77), which suggests that the k = ∞ transition is of a
geometrical nature.
Unless we revert back to uniform noise levels, a trans-
formation like αc(W (T )) = erf[x] will now no longer be
helpful; to find the location of the phase transition one
has to solve (82), together with the condition k = ∞.
Upon putting y2 = α/2(1 + c) one can, however, com-
pactify these two coupled equations to
1 =
∫ 1
0
dλ w(λ)λ2
{
erf[yλ]− 1 + e
−y2λ2
yλ
√
π
}
, (85)
α =
∫ 1
0
dλ w(λ)erf[yλ]. (86)
We will finally work out our equations describing the
system with inhomogeneous multiplicative decision noise
explicitly for the following simple bi-modal distribution
W (T ′) = ǫ δ[T ′ − T ] + (1− ǫ)δ[T ′], (87)
with ǫ ∈ [0, 1]. For ǫ = 1 we revert back to the homo-
geneous case studied earlier in this section; for ǫ = 0 we
return to the model of [12]. Here we have
w(λ) = ǫδ[λ− λ(T )] + (1 − ǫ)δ[λ− 1], (88)
with the function λ(T ) as defined in (6). The general
equations (82,83) from which to solve c and φ reduce to
c = ǫ
{
λ2(T )− 2λ(T )
√
1+c
2πα
e−
αλ2(T )
2(1+c)
−
[
λ2(T )− 1+c
α
]
erf
[√
αλ2(T )
2(1 + c)
]}
+(1− ǫ)
{
1− 2
√
1+c
2πα
e−
α
2(1+c)
−
[
1− 1+c
α
]
erf
[√
α
2(1 + c)
]}
, (89)
φ = 1− ǫ erf
[√
αλ2(T )
2(1 + c)
]
− (1− ǫ)erf
[√
α
2(1 + c)
]
.
(90)
Similarly, the two coupled equations (85,86) which define
the phase transition reduce to
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FIG. 5. The asymptotic fraction of frozen agents φ as
a function of α = p/N , for multiplicative noise with
W (T ′) = ǫδ[T ′ − T ] + (1 − ǫ)δ[T ′], for T = 1 and differ-
ent choices of the width (ǫ = 0, 0.5, 1 from bottom to top).
Markers: individual simulation runs, with pN = αN2 = 106
and homogeneous initial conditions where qi(0) = q(0) (cir-
cles: q(0) = 0, squares: q(0) = 10) and in excess of 1000
iteration steps. Solid curves for α > αc(W (T )): analytical
predictions. For α < αc(W (T )), where they should no longer
be correct, they have been continued as dashed lines.
1 = ǫ λ2(T )
{
erf[yλ(T )]− 1 + e
−y2λ2(T )
yλ(T )
√
π
}
+ (1− ǫ)
{
erf[y]− 1 + e
−y2
y
√
π
}
, (91)
α = ǫ erf[yλ(T )] + (1 − ǫ)erf[y]. (92)
Note that for T → 0 our transition line equations reduce
once more to those of the noise-free case, as derived in
[12], giving αc ≈ 0.33740. For T → ∞, in contrast, we
find a strong dependence on ǫ (the fraction of traders
who experience decision noise). In particular, there is a
qualitative difference between ǫ < 1 and ǫ = 1 (where
one of the two noise levels in the system becomes zero).
For ǫ = 1 we return to the case of uniform decision
noise, and equations (91,92) dictate that the transition
line obeys α → 0 as T → ∞. For ǫ < 1 (i.e. a nonzero
fraction of the traders take decisions deterministically),
on the other hand, we find for T → ∞ the equations
(91,92) (which will now have a solution with finite y)
reducing to
1 = (1 − ǫ)
{
erf[y]− 1 + e
−y2
y
√
π
}
, (93)
α = (1 − ǫ)erf[y]. (94)
Equivalently:
√
π
[
2− ǫ− α
1− ǫ
]
erfinv
[
α
1− ǫ
]
= e
−
[
erfinv[ α1−ǫ ]
]2
. (95)
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FIG. 6. The phase diagram for multiplicative noise with
W (T ′) = ǫδ[T ′ − T ] + (1 − ǫ)δ[T ′] and Gaussian dis-
tributed z, shown in the (α, T ) plane for different values of ǫ
(ǫ ∈ {0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1}, from right to left). For each value
of ǫ, the solid line separates a non-ergodic phase with anoma-
lous response (left) from an ergodic one without anomalous
response (right). For additive noise our theory predicts the
T -independent transition given by the vertical line (i.e. the
ǫ = 0 curve).
The solution of this equation defines the point αc(ǫ, T =
∞), which obeys αc(ǫ < 1, T = ∞) > 0 and αc(1, T =
∞) = 0.
In figures 4 and 5 we show the (numerical) solution
of equation (89) for the persistent correlation c, and the
corresponding value for the fraction φ of frozen agents, as
given by (90), as functions of α and for different choices
of the parameters {T, ǫ}, together with the corresponding
values for c and φ as obtained by carrying out numerical
simulations. Here we have chosen Gaussian distributed
zj(ℓ), i.e. λ(T ) = erf[1/T
√
2]. As before, one observes ex-
cellent agreement between theory and experiment above
αc, and a strong dependence on initial conditions below
αc. Finally, in figure 6 we show, in the (α, T ) plane, the
system’s phase diagram as defined by the k = ∞ tran-
sition line, obtained by solving numerically the coupled
equations (91,92), for different values of ǫ.
VII. STATIONARY VOLATILITY FOR
α > αC(W (T ))
As in the noise-free case [12], one finds that the volatil-
ity matrix (12), which is to be calculated from expressions
(35) and which in a stationary state is time-translation-
invariant Ξtt′ = Ξ(t − t′), generally involves both long-
term and short-term fluctuations. Hence even the ordi-
nary single-time stationary volatility σ2 = Ξ(0) cannot
be expressed in terms of the persistent order parame-
ter c (or its relatives k and φ). Upon separating in the
functions C and G the persistent from the non-persistent
terms, i.e. C(t) = c+ C˜(t) and G(t) = G˜(t) (there is no
persistent response for α > αc), we find, as in [12]:
σ2 =
1 + c
2(1 + k)2
+
lim
τ→∞
1
2τ
∑
u≤τ
∑
t′t′′
(1 + G˜)−1ut′C˜t′t′′(1 + G˜
T )−1t′′u. (96)
Obtaining an exact expression for σ2 would require
solving our coupled saddle-point equations (36,37) for
Ctt′ and Gtt′ for large times but finite temporal sep-
arations t − t′, hence in practice one has to re-
sort to approximations. The approximation chosen in
[7,8], for instance, is in our language equivalent to
substituting 〈σ[qi(t), zi(t)|T ]σ[qj(t), zj(t)|T ]〉 → δij +
(1−δij)〈σ[qi(t), zi(t)|T ]〉〈σ[qj(t), zj(t)|T ]〉. Here we will
generalise to the case of decision noise the (at least for
the batch MG) slightly more accurate approximation pro-
posed in [12]. We will abbreviate the double averages∫
dT W (T )〈. . .〉 as 〈〈. . .〉〉. In order to find the volatility
we separate the correlations at stationarity in a ‘frozen’
and a ‘fickle’ contribution:
C(t− t′) = φ〈〈σ[q(t), zt|T ]σ[q(t′), zt′ |T ]〉〉fr (97)
+(1− φ)〈〈σ[q(t), zt|T ]σ[q(t′), zt′ |T ]〉〉fi, (98)
which gives, using C˜(t − t′) = C(t − t′) − c, and upon
rewriting the ‘fickle’ contribution to the volatility:
σ2 =
1
2(1 + k)2
+ lim
τ→∞
1− φ
2τ
∑
u≤τ
〈〈
[∑
t
(1 + G˜)−1ut σ[q(t), zt|T ]
]2
〉〉fi
+ lim
τ→∞
φ
2τ
∑
u≤τ
∑
tt′
(1 + G˜)−1ut (1 + G˜
T )−1t′u
×〈〈σ[q(t), zt|T ]σ[q(t′), zt′ |T ]〉〉fr. (99)
The approximation of [12] consists of retaining in the
contribution from ‘fickle’ agents only the instantaneous
u = t terms, the rationale being that the u 6= t ones
represent in the original single-trader equation a retarded
self-interaction, which is assumed to be significant only
for ‘frozen’ agents. Hence we obtain
σ2 =
1
2(1 + k)2
+
1
2
(1− φ)
+ lim
τ→∞
φ
2τ
∑
u≤τ
∑
tt′
(1 + G˜)−1ut (1 + G˜
T )−1t′u
×〈〈σ[q(t), zt|T ]σ[q(t′), zt′ |T ]〉〉fr. (100)
Note that, according to (83,84), the integrated response
k can be expressed in terms of the order parameter φ as
k = (1 − φ)/(α− 1 + φ).
At this stage we again have to distinguish between ad-
ditive noise and multiplicative noise, in order to work
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FIG. 7. The asymptotic volatility σ as a function of α,
for multiplicative noise with W (T ) = δ[T − T ] and different
choices of the noise strength (T = 0, 1, 2 from bottom to
top in α > αc regime). Markers: individual simulation runs,
with pN = αN2 = 106 and homogeneous initial conditions
where qi(0) = q(0) (circles: q(0) = 0, squares: q(0) = 10)
and in excess of 1000 iteration steps. Thick solid curves for
α > αc(W (T )): analytical predictions for homogeneous mul-
tiplicative decision noise. For α < αc(W (T )), where they
should no longer be correct, they have been continued as thick
dashed lines. For additive decision noise our theory predicts
independence of T , i.e. σ as given by the T = 0 curve of
multiplicative noise.
out the remaining averages. For additive noise one simply
finds
〈〈σ[q(t), zt|T ]σ[q(t′), zt′ |T ]〉〉fr = 〈〈σ[q˜(t)]σ[q˜(t′)]〉〉fr = 1,
and hence we recover the expression describing the noise-
free case in [12]:
σ2 =
1 + φ
2(1 + k)2
+
1
2
(1− φ). (101)
Since the order parameters φ and k are, for additive noise,
independent of the noise distribution, the same is true for
the volatility. This independence of the noise parameters,
at least for α > αc (in line with [10,11]), again finds
confirmation in numerical simulations (that is, within the
limits imposed by our approximation; one does observe
some weak effect, which could either be due to excessive
relation times or due to the retarded self-interaction of
‘fickle’ traders, which we neglected in deriving (101)).
The more interesting case, as before, is that of multi-
plicative noise. Here we have
〈〈σ[q(t), zt|T ]σ[q(t′), zt′ |T ]〉〉fr = 〈〈λ2(T )〉〉fr
+δtt′ [1− 〈〈λ2(T )〉〉fr]. (102)
Hence the approximation (100) reduces to
10−1 100
100
σ
α
FIG. 8. The asymptotic volatility σ as a function of α, for
multiplicative noise with W (T ′) = ǫδ[T ′ − T ] + (1 − ǫ)δ[T ′],
for T = 1 and different choices of the width (ǫ = 0, 0.5, 1
from bottom to top in the α > αc regime). Markers: indi-
vidual simulation runs, with pN = αN2 = 106 and homoge-
neous initial conditions where qi(0) = q(0) (circles: q(0) = 0,
squares: q(0) = 10) and in excess of 1000 iteration steps.
Solid curves for α > αc(W (T )): analytical predictions. For
α < αc(W (T )), where they should no longer be correct, they
have been continued as dashed lines.
σ2 =
1 + φχ
2(1 + k)2
+
1
2
(1 − φ)
+
1
2
φ(1 − χ)[(1 + G˜)−1(1 + G˜T )−1](0). (103)
Here we have used time-translation invariance of the sta-
tionary state, giving [. . .]tt → [. . .](t−t) = [. . .](0) for the
relevant matrix elements in (103). The conditional aver-
age χ = 〈〈λ2(T )〉〉fr, constrained by |η| >
√
αλ(T )/(1+k)
(which, in the case of multiplicative noise, is the condi-
tion for an agent to be frozen) and calculated using the
variance 〈η2〉 = (1 + c)/(1 + k)2 (64) of the zero-average
persistent noise term, is given by
χ = 〈〈λ2(T )〉〉fr
=
∫∞
0
dT W (T )λ2(T )
∫
Dz θ
[
|z| −
√
αλ(T )√
1+c
]
∫∞
0 dT W (T )
∫
Dz θ
[
|z| −
√
αλ(T )√
1+c
]
=
∫ 1
0 dλ w(λ)λ
2
[
1− erf
(
λ
√
α√
2(1+c)
)]
∫ 1
0
dλ w(λ)
[
1− erf
(
λ
√
α√
2(1+c)
)] . (104)
We note that only for W (T ) = δ(T ) [12], i.e. w(λ) =
δ(λ − 1), where χ = 1, will (103) involve only persistent
observables. In the presence of decision noise, as in this
study, one always has χ < 1, and additional approxima-
tions are required to reduce also the last term in (103)
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further to an expression in terms of persistent order pa-
rameters only. This is done in detail in the appendix,
where we show that a reasonable approximation is ob-
tained by simply putting [(1 + G˜)−1(1 + G˜T )−1](0)→ 1.
The end result is the following final approximation for
the stationary state volatility:
σ2 =
1 + φχ
2(1 + k)2
+
1
2
(1 − φ) + 1
2
φ(1 − χ), (105)
with χ as given by (104).
Expression (105), which reverts back to that of [12]
for T → 0 and which also reduces correctly to the ran-
dom trading limit σ = 1 for T → ∞ (where φ = 1,
c = k = χ = 0), turns out to be a surprisingly accurate
approximation of the volatility for α > αc (i.e. in its
regime of validity). This can be observed in Figures 7
and 8, where we compare the approximate prediction
(105) to the volatility as observed in numerical simula-
tions, for both homogeneous multiplicative noise defined
by W (T ) = δ[T − T ] and for inhomogeneous multiplica-
tive noise defined by (87,88), respectively. In all cases
λ(T ) = erf[1/T
√
2] (note: the persistent order parame-
ters have already been calculated in the previous section).
The above results emphasize once more the qualitative
difference between additive and multiplicative noise: in
contrast to additive noise, the system remains sensitive
to multiplicative noise even for α > αc. The resulting
dependence of the volatility on the multiplicative noise
strength is very similar to that reported in [6] for addi-
tive noise (which was later understood to be caused by
insufficient equilibration [10,11]).
VIII. DISCUSSION
In this paper we have generalised the Thermal Minor-
ity Game [6] to the case of imhomogeneous agent pop-
ulations (where the decision noise, which can be either
additive or multiplicative, is of non-uniform strength).
We have solved the dynamics of the batch version of this
model by generalizing the recent application [12] to the
Minority Game of the generating functional techniques
of [13] (note that in [12] only the fully deterministic case
was studied). This formalism reduces the N -agent dy-
namics, in the limit N →∞, to a stochastic process for a
single ‘effective agent’, with dynamic equations involving
coloured noise and a retarded self-interaction. It leads to
exact closed (but implicit and non-trivial) equations for
correlation- and response-functions.
Our theory enables us to (i) obtain an analytical and
quantitative understanding of previously observed but
unexplained phenomena (e.g. suppression of the volatil-
ity by decision noise, even below random, due to damping
of the ‘crowd anti-crowd’ oscillations), (ii) derive exact
phase diagrams, and (iii) calculate macroscopic observ-
ables (e.g. the fraction of frozen agents and the persistent
correlations) in ergodic stationary states exactly2. In the
case of additive decision noise we find a phase diagram
identical to that of deterministic decision making in the
onset of and equilibrium properties of the higher α er-
godic phase, with non-ergodic behaviour at lower α. In
the case of multiplicative decision noise, in contrast, we
arrive at phase diagrams with non-trivial decision noise
dependencies of the phase separation line as well as the
behaviour of both phases. Here the control parameters
are the relative number of possible value for the external
information, α = p/N , and the parameters character-
izing the noise statistics. In the non-ergodic regime of
the model (i.e. for sufficiently small α), our closed equa-
tions in terms of correlation- and response functions are
still exact, and can be solved in principle iteratively for
arbitrary times; however, finding the stationary states
is hard (see e.g. the calculations for the simpler case
[12])3. Here we have restricted our calculations in the
non-ergodic regime to the the first few time-steps, find-
ing noise dependence for both additive and multiplicative
decision noise.
In the present paper we have only worked out explic-
itly two types of choices for the decision noise strengths
statistics: a delta distribution (i.e. decision noise of uni-
form strength), and a parametrized class of bi-model dis-
tributions. Due to the general nature of our solution,
however, there is no limit to the different types of noise
statistics we could have studied. This emphasizes once
more the remarkable potential and appropriateness to
the Minority Games of the generating functional analy-
sis methods of [13]. Two natural next steps would be to
develop the generating functional formalism for the orig-
inal ‘on-line’ formulation of the game, where the external
information is fed to the agents sequentially (this is the
subject of [14]), or to analyze our present (exact) order
parameter equations further in the non-ergodic region
α < αc(W (T )).
2Although the stationary state equations derived upon as-
suming ergodicity and absence of long-term memory are no
longer valid in the non-ergodic regime, Figures 1,2, 4 and 5
show that for α < αc(W (T )) their predictions regarding the
persistent observables c and φ nevertheless give good qualita-
tive agreement with the results of simulations from a highly
biased start (for the volatility σ, which also involves non-
persistent order parameters, this is no longer the case).
3Note that a recently proposed procedure [16] for calculating
at least the high-volatility stationary state in the non-ergodic
regime, based on assuming the integrated response function
(which diverges exactly at the critical point) to remain infinite
throughout the α < αc region, is not likely to work for the case
of decision noise. It would, for instance, predict the simple
relation φ = 1 − α (i.e. φ being independent of the noise
parameters), which is clearly in conflict with the simulation
experiments presented in this paper.
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APPENDIX A: APPROXIMATION OF
NON-PERSISTENT TERMS IN THE
STATIONARY VOLATILITY
The term Q = [(1 + G˜)−1(1 + G˜T )−1](0) in (103),
which contains contributions of non-persistent order pa-
rameters, can be written as
Q =
∫ π
−π
dω
2π
1
|1 + Gˆ(ω)|2 , (A1)
with the definition Gˆ(ω) =
∑
t G˜(t)e
−iωt. The simplest
approximation for G˜(t), which respects causality and also
meets the requirement
∑
t G˜(t) = k, is an exponential
expression of the form G˜(t > 0) → k(1 − γ)γt−1 (with
−1 < γ < 1 and with G˜(t ≤ 0) = 0). This gives Gˆ(ω) =
k(1− γ)/(eiω − γ), and thus
Q =
∫ π
−π
dω
2π
|eiω − γ|2
|eiω − γ + k(1− γ)|2 (A2)
We will obtain an estimate for γ by carrying out an ap-
proximate calculation of the one-step response function
G˜(1) =
∂
∂θ(t)
〈 σ[q(t+ 1), zt+1|T ] 〉⋆ (A3)
We insert (34), we use the fact that the response of frozen
agents will be zero, we repeat our previous ansatz that
fickle agents do not experience a retarded self-interaction,
and we carry out the average over the decision noise vari-
able zt. This is followed by carrying out the average over
η(t) (which is Gaussian, with variance 〈η2(t)〉 = 2σ2; we
assume, within the context of the present approximation,
the correlations between η(t) and the persistent noise η
not to be important for fickle agents). This gives
G˜(1) =
1− φ
σ
√
πα
〈〈λ(T )e−[q2(t)/α+α]/4σ2
×
[
cosh[
|q(t)|
2σ2
] + λ(T ) sinh[
|q(t)|
2σ2
]
]
〉〉fi. (A4)
In this expression we simply replace |q(t)| → 0 (fickle
agents being described by values of q(t) which oscil-
late around zero), and we calculate the residual average
〈〈λ(T )〉〉fi similar to our calculation of (104). Hence we
arrive at the approximation
G˜(1) ≈ 1− φ
σ
√
πα
e−α/4σ
2

∫ 1
0 dλ w(λ)λerf
(
λ
√
α√
2(1+c)
)
∫ 1
0
dλ w(λ)erf
(
λ
√
α√
2(1+c)
)
 .
(A5)
On the other hand, according to our ansatz G˜(t > 0) =
k(1 − γ)γt−1 we must demand G˜(1) = k(1 − γ), so that
(A5) leads to the following estimate of γ:
γ ≈ 1− 1− φ
σk
√
πα
e−α/4σ
2

∫ 1
0
dλ w(λ)λerf
(
λ
√
α√
2(1+c)
)
∫ 1
0 dλ w(λ)erf
(
λ
√
α√
2(1+c)
)
 .
(A6)
Since for α→∞ we must find σ → 1 (random trading),
and since k ∼ α−1 (77), we conclude from (A6) that
γ → 1 for α → ∞. Conversely, as α is lowered, we
find a divergence of k at finite αc (where also φ is finite).
Hence (A6) also predicts that γ → 1 for α→ αc. We now
assume that γ → 1 will give a sensible approximation in
the whole range α > αc, and use (A2) to arrive at the
approximate result
[(1 + G˜)−1(1 + G˜T )−1](0) ≈ 1. (A7)
The above derivation is clearly far from rigorous, and not
quite satisfactory; it simply appears the best one can do
without actually solving the order parameter equations
for finite time differences in the stationary state. Yet
(A7) turns out to lead to a surprisingly accurate approx-
imation for the volatility (see the main text).
[1] D. Challet and Y.-C. Zhang, Physica A 246, 407 (1997).
[2] R. Savit, R. Manuca and R. Riolo, Phys. Rev. Lett. 82,
2203 (1999).
[3] W. Arthur, Am. Econ. Assoc. Papers and Proc. 84, 406
(1994).
[4] D. Challet, http://www.unifr.ch/econophysics/minority/
(an extensive commented collection of work on the mi-
nority game).
[5] A. Cavagna, Phys. Rev. E 59, R3783 (1999).
[6] A. Cavagna, J. Garrahan, I. Giardina and D. Sherring-
ton, Phys. Rev. Lett. 83, 4429 (1999).
[7] D. Challet, M. Marsili, and R. Zecchina, Phys. Rev. Lett.
84, 1824 (2000).
[8] M. Marsili, D. Challet, and R. Zecchina, Physica A 280,
522 (2000).
[9] J. Garrahan, E. Moro, and D. Sherrington, Phys. Rev. E
62, R9 (2000).
[10] D. Challet, M. Marsili and R. Zecchina, Phys. Rev. Lett.
85, 5008 (2000).
[11] A. Cavagna, J. Garrahan, I. Giardina and D. Sherring-
ton, Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 5009 (2000).
[12] J.A.F. Heimel and A.C.C. Coolen, Phys. Rev. E 63,
056121 (2001).
[13] C. De Dominicis, Phys. Rev. B 18, 4913 (1978).
[14] A.C.C. Coolen and J.A.F. Heimel, manuscript in prepa-
ration (2001).
[15] H. Sompolinsky and A. Zippelius, Phys. Rev. B. 25, 6860
(1982).
[16] A. De Martino and J.A.F. Heimel, manuscript in prepa-
ration (2001).
14
